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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the Supreme Court granting certioari in Arizona v. United States,1 it will be 
the first time in thirty years that the Court will hear a foreign affairs preemption case 
concerning immigration.2  This is a fact that most commentators have overlooked as 
they focus on the case in the constraints of traditional preemption theories.3  Indeed, 
                                                          
 Patrick J. Charles is the author of numerous articles on immigration, including The Plenary 
Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of Ideological Exclusion: A Historical Perspective, 
15 TEX. REV.  L. & POL. 61 (2010), Representation Without Documentation?: Unlawfully 
Present Aliens, Apportionment, the Doctrine of Allegiance, and the Law, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 35 
(2011), and Decoding the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause: Unlawful Immigrants, 
Allegiance, Personal Subjection, and the Law, 51 WASHBURN L.J. (forthcoming 2012).  Mr. 
Charles received his J.D. from Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, and his B.A. in History 
and International Affairs from the George Washington University.  He is a historian for the 
United States Air Force 352nd Special Operations Group stationed at Mildenhall, United 
Kingdom and independent consultant on constitutional matters.  The author would like to 
thank Juliet P. Stumpf (Lewis & Clark Law School) for her helpful comments and advice. 
 1 See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 366 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3354 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2011) (No. 11-182). 
 2 See generally Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (addressing foreign affairs preemption 
as applied to a Maryland in-state tuition law affecting G-4 visa holders). 
 3 See Lauren Gilbert, Presuming Preemption: Implications of Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting, SCOTUSBLOG (July 5, 2011, 9:31 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/ 
presuming-preemption-implications-of-mchamber-of-commerce-v-whiting/ (discussing the 
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the federal government is claiming provisions of Arizona S.B. 1070 are 
unconstitutional under a number of preemption approaches,4 but the focal point of 
each theory is that these provisions conflict with the comprehensive federal scheme 
as to impede on foreign policy.5   
It is an argument that the federal government is litigating in other states that have 
enacted copycat immigration through enforcement laws, including Alabama6 and 
South Carolina7 respectively.  What is unique about the argument is it downplays 
congressional intent as guidance, and in its place asserts foreign affairs preemption 
through executive foreign policy objectives.8   
At the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, a two judge majority agreed with this 
preemption theory, and buttressed their stance by citing to an amicus brief filed by 
foreign officials and international governing bodies.9  In particular, the two judges 
applied a rather broad foreign affairs preemption analysis to S.B. 1070 Section 2(B), 
which requires every “law enforcement official or a law enforcement agency” to 
make a “reasonable attempt” at verifying an alien‟s immigration status where a 
“reasonable suspicion” arises that the alien is unlawfully present.10  The majority 
found such a state immigration verification requirement as undermining the 
President‟s executive authority “to establish immigration enforcement priorities and 
                                                          
implications of the “presumption against preemption, and the doctrines of field, express, and 
conflict preemption); Larry Joseph, Arizona v. United States: Narrowing Prevent-or-Frustrate 
Conflict Preemption, SCOTUSBLOG (July 15, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com 
/2011/07/arizona-v-united-states-narrowing-%e2%80%9cprevent-or-frustrate%e2%80%9d-
conflict-preemption/ (focusing on conflict preemption, even in the constraints of foreign 
policy considerations); Richard Samp, The Constitutionality of S.B. 1070, SCOTUSBLOG (July 
11, 2011, 9:28 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/the-constitutionality-of-s-b-1070/ 
(focusing analysis on implied preemption only). 
 4 See Brief for Appellee at 23-24, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 10-16645).  
 5 Id. at 25-28, 47-49, 61-63.   
 6 See Brief for Appellant at 10, 18, 20, 22-25, 26, 27, 30, 36, 37, 40, United States v. 
Alabama, 443 F. App‟x 411 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-14532-CC), 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
20942, available at http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/213/344161/ 
USA_v._Alabama,_Brief_for_Appellant_(11th_Cir._Nov._14,_2011).pdf.  
 7 See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1-3, 6-7, 9, 15-16, 24, United 
States v. South Carolina, No. 2:11-CV-2958 (D. S.C. Dec. 22, 2011), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151549, available at  http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/us-v-sc-complaint.pdf. 
 8 See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 353 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Alabama, No. 2:11-CV-2746-SLB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112362, at *52-53 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 
28, 2011).  See also Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights. v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 
(N.D. Ga. 2011). 
 9 Arizona, 641 F.3d at 351-53. 
 10 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1051(B) (LexisNexis 2011). Utah maintains a similar 
requirement.  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1003(1)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring police 
officers to verify the immigration status of vehicle passengers where there is a reasonable 
suspicion to believe that the vehicle contains unlawful immigrants). 
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strategies.”11  The majority stated the verification requirement‟s enforcement would 
have a “deleterious effect on the United States‟ foreign relations” to the point that it 
creates “actual foreign policy problems of a magnitude far greater than incidental.”12 
In dissent, Judge Carlos T. Bea found the executive foreign policy argument 
unconvincing.  He pointed out that absent any international agreements or treaties 
supplementing the federal scheme, congressional intent controlled any foreign 
preemption analysis, not the whims of the executive branch.13  Particularly, Bea 
found Section 2(B) to work in accordance with the federal immigration scheme, for 
it embraced and furthered Congress‟s purpose of deterring unlawful immigration.14  
Bea argued that unless the federal government could pinpoint “established foreign 
relations goals” to the contrary, any foreign affairs preemption argument is 
insufficient as a matter of law.15  In other words, the federal government had to do 
more than demonstrate “any effect on foreign relations generally.”16  
Other recent federal court decisions analyzing “attrition through enforcement” 
challenges reveal a similar divide over foreign affairs preemption.  In Georgia 
Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia applied the doctrine loosely to a Georgia law requiring 
law enforcement officials to determine the immigration status of criminal suspects 
when the suspect cannot provide one of five identity documents.17  Although the 
Georgia law is facially less intrusive than S.B. 1070 Section 2(B), the court held that 
it conflicted with “Executive Branch discretion” and had a “direct and immediate” 
impact on United States foreign relations.18 
In United States v. South Carolina, the United States District Court of South 
Carolina agreed with this approach, and buttressed the theory with other 
interpretational tools.19  Presiding over the case, Judge Richard Mark Gergel jointly 
field preempted, implied obstacle preempted, and foreign affairs preempted a South 
Carolina law directing state and local law enforcement officers to verify the 
immigration status of persons whom they have a “reasonable suspicion” to believe 
are unlawfully present in the United States.   
In coming to his decision, Gergel took into account a number of considerations.  
The first being a politically prepared statement by Deputy Secretary of State William 
                                                          
 11 Arizona, 641 F.3d at 352 (citing Crosby v. Nat‟l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 
377 (2000)). 
 12 Id. at 352-353. 
 13 Id. at 380-81 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
 14 Id. at 382. 
 15 Id. at 381. 
 16 Id.  
 17 Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 
2011). 
 18 Id. at 1333. 
 19 United States v. South Carolina, No. 2:11-CV-02958-RMG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151549, at *1 (D. S.C. Dec. 22, 2011), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org 
/sites/default/files/docs/lac/US-v-South-Carolina-order-on-temporary-injunction-12-22-
2011.pdf.  
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Burns, which he found convincing because South Carolina did not admit any 
equivalent “statements or other evidence to counter Secretary Burns‟ declaration 
regarding the potential adverse impact . . . on American foreign policy interests.”20  
The other considerations Gergel took into account were the Constitution vesting 
plenary power over foreign affairs with the federal government, Supreme Court 
foreign affairs preemption precedent, executive discretion when determining “federal 
enforcement priorities,” and the affordance of agency deference when interpreting 8 
U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10), which authorizes the states to cooperate in the identification of 
unlawful aliens.21   
In conclusion, Gergel summed up the issuance of a temporary injunction, partly 
on foreign affairs preemption, as follows:  
[Section 6] is without consideration of federal enforcement priorities and 
unquestionably vastly expands the persons targeted for immigration 
enforcement action.  The United States asserts that this state statutory 
scheme will disrupt federal enforcement operations and burden finite 
immigration enforcement resources.  The breadth and volume of these 
state-mandated immigration inquiries and investigations would . . . raise 
significant foreign relations problems that would likely adversely affect 
American foreign policy interests.22 
In contrast to the district courts in Georgia and South Carolina, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama found that “something more is 
required” than the executive branch claiming diplomatic interference to “enjoin an 
otherwise valid state law on foreign policy grounds.”23  Examining a number of 
Alabama H.B. 56 provisions, the court concurred with the approach taken in Judge 
Bea‟s Ninth Circuit dissent.  The court stated that the executive branch “must have 
some evidence of a national foreign policy” before foreign affairs preemption can 
even be considered.24  While this could be proven by “either some evidence of 
Congress‟s intent or a treaty or international agreement establishing the national 
position,”25 some actual hard evidence was necessary. 
The doctrinal divide over foreign affairs preemption even exists among members 
of the legal academy.  Scholars on the extreme left26 assert that foreign affairs 
preemption should apply to any state law that assists in the enforcement of federal 
immigration law.  Take for instance Huyen Pham who argues state enforcement 
creates “a thousand borders” of „nonuniformity,‟ which is unconstitutional because 
immigration laws must be “exercised uniformly and exclusively by the federal 
                                                          
 20 Id. at 31. 
 21 Id. at 32-36. 
 22 Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 
 23 United States v. Alabama, No. 2:11-CV-2746-SLB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112362, at 
*54-55 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011). 
 24 Id. at *57. 
 25 Id.  
 26 See Peter H. Shuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
57, 58 n.3 (claiming most immigration scholars support lenient immigration policies). 
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government.”27  Michael A. Olivas conceives a similar standard of review.  He 
asserts that any shift of immigration enforcement to the states as “contrary to 
constitutional law and theory” in that it acquiesces to fifty unique foreign affairs or 
immigration policies.28  In agreement, Keith Cunningham-Parameter finds the 
overwhelming majority of state immigration laws as conflicting with United States 
equal protection principles, thus undermining federalism principles to include federal 
power over immigration.29   
In complete disagreement with foreign affairs preemption altogether, a 1994 
article by Peter J. Spiro audaciously argued that the courts should do away with the 
doctrine, because “[a]s a practical matter, immigration is now largely a state-level 
concern.”30  To date, no court has honored this request, but two prominent 
immigration scholars concur with Spiro‟s baseline argument that state measures are a 
constitutional tool in deterring unlawful immigration or at least perfecting any flaws 
with the federal scheme.  Peter H. Schuck calls his approach “immigration 
federalism,” which allows the states to operate under “federal immigration policies 
and supervision.”31  Strengthening Shuck‟s base-line thesis, Kris W. Kobach argues 
the states maintain inherent authority to work within the federal scheme as long as 
they do not violate traditional preemption doctrine principles.32  Responding to leftist 
foreign affairs preemption claims, Kobach writes that foreign affairs preemption 
cannot come into question without the “crucial qualifier” that the state law is 
“inconsistent with federal policy.”33  
However, if the Supreme Court follows Kobach‟s logic, foreign affairs 
preemption will be diminished to nothing more than conflict preemption.  This is 
doctrinally problematic.  Kobach wants to limit the foreign affairs preemption query 
                                                          
 27 Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting 
Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 
991-98 (2004) [hereinafter Pham, Inherent Flaws].  See generally Huyen Pham, The 
Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?: Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration 
Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2006) [hereinafter Pham, Local Sovereignty] (arguing 
traditional federalism values are destroyed by state and local governments enforcing federal 
immigration law). 
 28 Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, 
Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 35, 53 (2007) 
[hereinafter Olivas, Proper Role for Enforcement].  See also Michael A. Olivas, Preempting 
Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT‟L L. 
217, 220 (1994) [hereinafter Olivas, Preempting Preemption]. 
 29 Keith Cunningham-Parameter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of 
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1722 (2011). 
 30 Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. 
INT‟L L. 121, 123 (1994) [hereinafter Spiro, The States and Immigration].  See also Peter J. 
Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (1997) 
[hereinafter Spiro, Immigration Federalism]. 
 31 Schuck, supra note 26, at 66-67. 
 32 See generally Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to 
Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT‟L L. 155, 158 (2008).  
 33 Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local 
Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 229 (2005). 
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as follows: “What is the federal or foreign policy concerning unlawful 
immigration?”  The problem with this approach is the answer to Kobach‟s question 
will always satisfy state “attrition through enforcement” objectives—the deterrence 
of unlawful immigrants from entering, remaining, and working in the United States.  
In other words, if the Supreme Court agrees with Kobach‟s generalized analysis, 
every state or local law that deters unlawful immigration must survive a foreign 
affairs preemption claim; an interpretation that does not comport with prior Court 
precedent.34 
At the same time, the extreme opposite holds true if the Supreme Court accepts 
the logic of the Ninth Circuit majority.35  If compelling state and public officials to 
verify immigration status, in accordance with the federal scheme, impedes on 
executive foreign policy discretion, then almost the entire field of state immigration 
law should be preempted.36 
This begets the question: “Is foreign affairs preemption concerning immigration 
an all or nothing approach as the different lower courts and immigration scholars 
contend?”  The purpose of this article is to answer this question by recentering 
foreign affairs preemption in accordance with constitutional intent, an objective 
reading of Supreme Court precedent, and then reassembling the whole into a 
workable doctrine.   
This article will accomplish this in three parts.  First, this article provides a brief 
examination of the plenary power doctrine over immigration, and its constructs 
according to the Founders‟ Constitution.37  This inquiry provides federal courts with 
the historical guideposts necessary to adjudicate foreign affairs preemption claims.  
Second, this article provides an overview of Supreme Court foreign affairs 
preemption precedent, with a focus on the preemption of state immigration laws.  It 
confirms that the Court has never acquiesced to either an all inclusive or exclusive 
foreign affairs preemption doctrine as advanced by recent federal court decisions and 
scholars.38  Instead, the Court‟s precedent reveals a more centered approach where 
state or local immigration laws can be foreign affairs preempted despite advancing 
federal policy.  This primarily occurs when state or local governments make 
immigration adjudications without the cooperation of the federal government or are 
not expressly authorized to act by federal law.  Lastly, in light of this history and 
precedent, this article provides a three-part inquiry that should be used by the 
Supreme Court when adjudicating foreign affairs preemption in the constraints of 
immigration law.39 
                                                          
 34 See id. 
 35 Arizona v. United States, 641 F.3d 339, 351-53 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 36 See Pham, Inherent Flaws, supra note 27, at 34; Olivas, Proper Role for Enforcement, 
supra note 28, at 53; Cunningham-Parameter, supra note 29, at 1722. 
 37 See Patrick J. Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of 
Ideological Exclusions: An Historical Perspective, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 61, 67-118 (2010). 
 38 See Olivas, Proper Role for Enforcement, supra note 28, at 30. 
 39 See discussion infra Parts I-III.  
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II.  THE FOUNDERS‟ CONSTITUTION CONCERNING IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 
The use of history to adjudicate constitutional questions can often lead to more 
questions than answers, including the difficultly in accepting the moral opinions of 
generations prior as guiding the present.40  However, when the historical record leads 
to but one conclusion, the use of history provides constitutional stability to properly 
rule on a constitutional question.  As will be discussed in detail below, the one 
historical conclusion result holds true when defining the respective powers or 
spheres allotted to the federal and state governments over immigration.    
There has been little, if any, dispute in our nation‟s history that the federal 
government maintains unquestioned authority over the entry, departure, 
naturalization, and conditions of settlement that can be imposed upon immigrants.41  
Where there remains disagreement is the breadth of any concurrent or other 
immigration related powers reserved by the states.  This disagreement primarily 
stems from the history of the Early Republic.  During this period, the federal 
government imposed only a few laws affecting an alien‟s entry, departure, and 
conditions of settlement.42  Continuing through the nineteenth century, the only 
immigration field that the federal government took a consistent effort to occupy was 
that of naturalization.  In the meantime, the states filled the remaining void by 
enacting different measures affecting an alien‟s conditions of settlement.43 
The failure of the federal government to completely occupy the immigration field 
for much of our early history has led some contemporaries to argue that the states 
maintain inherent authority over immigration enforcement.44  The problem with 
coming to this conclusion, in terms of history, is that it ignores the origins of the 
Constitution, particularly the state centered problems the Articles of Confederation 
imposed on foreign affairs.45   
                                                          
 40 See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW‟S EMPIRE 363-65 (1986) (discussing the difficulty in 
conducting historical analysis with integrity). 
 41 For the past century that has been the dispute whether the immigration power is 
unbridled.  See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A 
Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 858-63 (1987) 
(describing Supreme Court cases expanding the federal government‟s powers over 
immigration); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-60 
(1990) (detailing the development and contours of the Plenary Power Doctrine).  However, the 
history of the Constitution and law of nations weighs heavily in favor of a plenary power 
doctrine.  See also Charles, supra note 37, at 65-88.  
 42 See Alien Enemy Act of 1798, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2006)); Steerage Act of 1819, ch. 66, § 2, 3 Stat. 488 (1819); An Act 
Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, § 3, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800); Naturalization Act of 1795, 
ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, superceded by Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 56, § 1, 1 Stat. 566 
(1798) (repealed 1802); An Act to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, § 1, 1 
Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed 1795). 
 43 See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, 
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19 (1996). 
 44 See Kobach, supra note 33, at 199-201. 
 45 For a concise and comprehensive history, see Charles, supra note 37, at 67-118. 
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At the time America declared independence in 1776, the law of nations 
prescribed that every sovereign was the gatekeeper of its borders.  Hugo Grotius 
described immigration as a “friendship” between nations.46  Immigration was never 
conceptualized as an individual right of persons,47 but a submission to the receiving 
government as the tacit condition of protection.48  Prominent international 
commentators Samuel Puffendorf, Emer de Vattel, William Blackstone, Daniel 
Defoe, Francis Bacon, and Matthew Bacon all attested to this rule of law.49  It 
remained an attribute to national sovereignty that the founding generation never 
questioned.50   
Arguably, United States sovereignty began in 1776 upon adopting the 
Declaration of Independence.51  This is significant because free migration advocates 
often point to the Declaration stipulating the crown “endeavoured to prevent the 
population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for . . . migrations 
hither”52 as effectuating a basic right to immigrate.53  However, the grievance solely 
referenced the crown usurping what was seen as colonial authority, not the 
recognition of any individualized rights to migrate.54  It is a historical point of 
emphasis that as eighteenth century American political thought progressed, the idea 
of virtual representation made less sense,55 and the colonists sought to establish a 
                                                          
 46 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 819 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925). 
 47 Id. at 201-02 (“permanent residence ought not to be denied to foreigners who, expelled 
from their homes, are seeking a refuge, provided that they submit themselves to the 
established government and observe any regulations which are necessary in order to avoid 
strifes”) (emphasis added). 
 48 See Patrick J. Charles, Representation Without Documentation?: Unlawfully Present 
Aliens, the Doctrine of Allegiance, and the Law, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 35, 76-81 (2011). 
 49 Charles, supra note 37, at 74-75, 78, 84-89. 
 50 Id. at 92-118. 
 51 For a history showing the need for foreign support and recognition, see PATRICK J. 
CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES: THE EVENTS THAT SHAPED THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE 299-324 (2008). 
 52 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 3 (U.S. 1776). 
 53 For some ahistorical claims that cast the Declaration of Independence as embodying 
immigration protections, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, 
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign 
Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 81 (2002); Brandon E. Davis, America’s Immigration Crisis: 
Examining the Necessity of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 54 LOY. L. REV. 353, 354 
(2008); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 938 (1991). 
 54 See Patrick J. Charles, Restoring ‘Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness’ in Our 
Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
457, 491-95 (2011) (addressing the grievances had to do with effectuating constitutional 
happiness with the consent of the governed, not virtual representation). 
 55 See generally JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 71 (2011) (discussing the lack of support for virtual representation after the 
tortious experience with the British Parliament). 
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government built upon the “consent of the governed” with equitable principles 
diffused throughout.56   
The Declaration‟s reference to “Laws of Nature” and “Nature‟s God” had 
nothing to do with individual natural rights.  Instead, these references were an 
acknowledgment of the law of nations,57 what was often referred to as the “laws of 
Nature” or “Nature‟s God.”58  Thus, from the United States‟ very beginning, the law 
of nations over foreign affairs, peace, commerce, and immigration was intertwined 
with our constitutional structure.  Although the Declaration itself did not grant the 
Continental Congress any express powers or duties, the nation‟s greatest legal minds 
understood these sovereign powers must be vested with this national body.59  This is 
supported by a number of Continental measures, including the sending of 
international emissaries, the formation of a national army, and the negotiation of 
treaties.  In terms of immigration law, few are aware that the 1776 Continental 
Congress offered the first national amnesty.  As a means to lure the German 
auxiliaries from the British lines,60 the following proclamation was issued: 
 
Whereas it has been the wise policy of these states to extend the 
protection of their laws to all those who should settle among them, of 
whatever nation or religion they might be, and to admit them to a 
participation of the benefits of civil and religious freedom; and, the 
benevolence of this practice, as well as its salutary effects, have rendered 
it worthy of being continued in future times . . . Resolved, Therefore, that 
these states will receive all such foreigners who shall leave the armies of 
his Britannic majesty in America, and shall chuse to become members of 
any of these states; that they shall be protected in the free exercise of their 
respective religions, and be invested with the rights, privileges and 
immunities of natives, as established by the laws of these states . . . .61 
                                                          
 56 Charles, supra note 54, at 461, 469, 482, 491-502. 
 57 See David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence and International Law, 59 WM. 
& MARY Q. 39 (2002).   
 58 See, e.g., 2 THE MAJOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PAPERS OF JOSIAH QUINCY JUNIOR 181 
(Daniel R. Coquillette and Neil Longley York eds., 2007).  See also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 66-67 (Oxford, Clarendon 1769) (showing the 
interrelation between the law of nature, municipal law, and the law of nations); 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 66-67 (Oxford, Clarendon 1769) 
(showing the same); EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 68-72 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 
2008) (discussing how the “law of nations is originally no other than the law of nature applied 
to nations”); Judge James Wilson, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court of the United 
States, for the District of Pennsylvania  (July 22, 1793), reprinted in THE NORTH-CAROLINA 
JOURNAL, August 21, 1793, at pg. 1 (“The LAW OF NATURE when applied to states or political 
societies receives a new name—that of the Law of  NATIONS . . . The law of Nations as well as 
the law of Nature is of obligation indispensible: the law of nations as well as the law of nature 
is of origin divine.”). 
 59 Charles, supra note 54, at 461-64. 
 60 For a history, see CHARLES, supra note 51, at 287-98. 
 61 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774-1789, at 653-54 (Gov‟t Printing 
Office 1906) (1776). 
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Much can be deduced from this proclamation in terms of immigration law.  
There are references to protection, participation, and the offer of equal privileges and 
immunities as a matter of good foreign policy.  At the same time, we also see that the 
affordance of protection and privileges rested on the tacit condition that they are 
admitted by the sovereign nation.   
This basic federal construct over international law was short lived upon the 
ratification of the Articles of Confederation.62  The Articles delegated to Congress 
defined legislative powers63 with the “consent of nine States,”64 leaving to the 
respective states their “sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the 
United States . . . .”65  In terms of foreign affairs, naturalization, citizenship, and 
immigration, the Articles proved problematic.  Despite being recognized as an 
independent nation, England and other countries were able to frustrate United States 
diplomatic relations by operating at the state level.66  
Meanwhile internally, the disparity between the laws of the respective states 
respecting the rights of citizenship was an influential factor in dispensing with the 
Articles of Confederation.67 Thus, to prevent any future foreign embarrassments, the 
framers intended for any sovereign powers deemed within the law of nations, foreign 
affairs, immigration, naturalization, and citizenship to rest with the federal 
government.68  This constitutional interpretation is supported by some of America‟s 
most prominent eighteenth century jurists.  For instance in 1793, John Marshall 
argued before Chief Justice John Jay and Associate Justice James Iredell that 
Congress has the “Right to legislate over Foreigners,” which “goes to rights of all 
kinds.”69  Three years earlier, Chief Justice John Jay delivered a charge to the grand 
jury on the importance of the “law of nations” in our constitutional structure, stating 
“[w]e had become a nation—as such we were responsible to others for the 
observance of the laws of nations; and as our national concerns were to be regulated 
by national laws, national tribunals became necessary for the interpretation and 
execution of them both.”70 
                                                          
 62 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781.  Although the Articles of Confederation were not 
yet in place with the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, the creation of the Articles 
were agreed in conjunction with the Declaration.  See 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 61, at 425-26 n.2.  
 63 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX. 
 64 Id. at art. X. 
 65 Id. at art. II. 
 66 PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF 
NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1814, at 94-95 (1993). 
 67 Charles, supra note 37, at 95-96. 
 68 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, 10 (granting the powers to “establish an uniform Rule 
of Naturalization” and “define” the “Offences against the Law of Nations”). 
 69 James Iredell, Oral Arguments to the Middle Circuit Court of Virginia (1793) (on file 
with the Library of Congress Rare Books Division). 
 70 JOHN JAY, THE CHARGE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE GRAND JURIES OF THE EASTERN 
CIRCUIT 7 (Portsmouth, N.H., George Jerry Osborne 1790). 
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Then in 1798, defending the Alien Act, Associate Justice James 
Iredell issued the following charge to the grand jury defending federal 
plenary power over aliens, and the importance of the conditions of 
settlement: [T]here are certain conditions, without which no alien can ever 
be admitted, if he stay ever so long; and one is . . . he has behaved as a 
man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the 
constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and 
happiness of the same . . . . Besides, any alien coming to this country must 
or ought to know, that this being an independent nation, it has all the 
rights concerning the removal of aliens which belong by the law of 
nations to any other; that while he remains in the country in the character 
of an alien, he can claim no other privilege than such as an alien is 
entitled to, and consequently, whatever risque he may incur in that 
capacity is incurred voluntarily, with the hope that in due time by his 
unexceptionable conduct, he may become a citizen of the United States.71 
Associate Justice William Cushing,72 Pennsylvania Judge Alexander Addison,73 
James Madison,74 Alexander Hamilton,75 and James Wilson76 also touched upon how 
the politics involving immigration were an issue of national concern in accordance 
with the law of nations and Constitution.  It was not until debate surfaced over the 
constitutionality of the 1798 Alien Act that the states claimed any immigration 
authority.  What is interesting about this debate is that there was no disagreement 
over the constitutional exclusion or expulsion of foreigners.77  There was also little, 
if any, debate up to that time that foreigners could be excluded from the privileges 
                                                          
 71 Associate Justice James Iredell, Charge to the Grand Jury, reprinted in CLAYPOOLE‟S 
AM. DAILY ADVERTISER (Philadelphia), May 16, 1799, at 2. 
 72 See The Honorable Judge Cushing, A Charge Delivered to the Federal Grand Jury for 
the District of Virginia, on the 23d Nov. 1798: By the Honorable Judge Cushing, published by 
request of the Grand Jury, THE EASTERN HERALD AND GAZETTE OF MAINE, Jan. 21, 1799, at 1-
2. 
 73 See ALEXANDER ADDISON, ON THE ALIEN ACT: A CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURIES OF THE 
COUNTRY COURTS OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 11 (Washington, 
John Colerick 1799); ALEXANDER ADDISON, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF 
THE VIRGINIA ASSEMBLY 21 (Philadelphia, Zachariah Poulson, Jr. 1800).  For the importance 
of Alexander Addison in American constitutional jurisprudence, see Patrick J. Charles, 
Originalism, John Marshall, and the Necessary and Proper Clause: Resurrecting the 
Jurisprudence of Alexander Addison, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 529, 529-74 (2010).  For historical 
proof that George Washington, Bushrod Washington, and John Marshall agreed with 
Addison‟s legal analysis concerning the 1798 Alien Act, see id. at 536-45. 
 74 For a summary of James Madison‟s views, see Charles, supra note 37, at 100-01, 107, 
116. 
 75 See 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 491-95 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1977) 
(discussing the national politics of admitting foreigners into the United States). 
 76 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1038-52 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall 
eds., 2007) (discussing the difference between citizens and aliens and how only foreigners of 
“good character” should be admitted, “for numbers without virtue are not our object”). 
 77 See Charles, supra note 37, at 108-18. 
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and immunities of federal or state citizenship.78  The center of the debate was 
whether the federal or state governments had the power to expel “alien friends.”79 
Ultimately, the consensus reached was that the federal government must be 
vested with sole authority over immigration in the interests of national self-
preservation.80  Despite the claims of some contemporary immigration scholars,81 
aliens did not retain any vested constitutional rights for lawfully settling.82  It was 
well established that any sovereign nation retained full authority to accept or send 
away aliens as prescribed by law.83  This was not to say that the states did not retain 
any authority over their respective political institutions or the granting of state 
privileges and immunities.84  These powers were unquestionably a matter of state 
sovereignty, which could be politically tailored to attract or deter immigrants into 
respective jurisdictions.85  However, unlike the Articles of Confederation that 
allowed the states to define citizenship, naturalize foreigners, and grant all the rights 
of citizenship throughout the Union,86 the Constitution only permitted the states to 
afford rights, privileges, and immunities within their respective sphere of 
government. 
At no point within this sphere did the states maintain the authority to usurp or 
undermine federal authority over immigration and foreign affairs.87  As the debates 
concerning the 1798 Alien Act confirm, to grant the states this authority is to 
undermine the Constitution itself, for our national self-preservation rested with the 
Union,88 not the individual preferences of individuals or the states.  In the words of 
Alexander Addison: 
                                                          
 78 Id. at 93-118. 
 79 Id. at 116-18. 
 80 Id. at 110-13. 
 81 See Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent 
Residents, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2011) (arguing for constitutional protections for lawful 
permanent residents from deportation for crimes committed); James E. Pfander & Theresa R. 
Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of The Early Republic: Prospectivity, 
Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 359-441 (2010) (arguing the founding 
generation viewed immigration in terms of transparency and prospectivity). 
 82 See Charles, supra note 37, at 67-118 (tracing the Anglo-American and international 
origins of plenary power over immigration as unquestioned). 
 83 Id. 
 84 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States”).   
 85 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1799-
1800 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
 86 Id. at § 1098; WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 79 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825); ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 197 (Liberty Fund 1999). 
 87 STORY, supra note 85, at § 1099. 
 88 Charles, supra note 37, at 108-18. 
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[The federal] government is vested all authority over general or national 
and external subjects . . . . And to this government we must owe the 
prosperity of our commerce, the payment of our debts, and our national 
defence.  To the government of each state is severally reserved authority 
over local and internal subjects, the administration of justice, and 
protection of persons and property within the territory of each.  And to 
this government we owe the security of those personal enjoyments which 
we regard life, liberty, reputation, and estate.89 
Addison was not alone in articulating the division of federal-state powers in 
terms of national and local interests.  In 1803, St. George Tucker described federal 
jurisdiction as encompassing “all cases arising under the political laws of the 
confederacy, or such as relate to its general concerns with foreign nations, or to the 
several states, as members of the confederacy.”90  Undoubtedly, any powers touching 
upon “foreign nations” included immigration law.  In contrast, Tucker did not even 
infer the states maintained any authority within the sphere of foreign affairs.  He 
defined state power as extending to the “cognizance of all matters of a civil nature, 
or such as properly belong to the head of municipal law; except in some few cases, 
where, by a special provision contained in the constitution either concurrent, or 
exclusive, jurisdiction is granted to the federal government.”91 
III.  OUR CONSTITUTIONAL “SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT” AS INTERFACE TO FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS PREEMPTION WITHIN IMMIGRATION LAW 
As Part I details, the founding generation intended for any powers concerning 
immigration to be vested with the federal government.  Despite the best intentions of 
the Articles of Confederation, the ability of the thirteen different states to disrupt 
foreign relations led to the adoption of the more resolute Constitution.  Essentially, 
the states were stripped of any immigration or foreign affairs powers as a means to 
prevent international embarrassments.  Indeed, the Constitution‟s federalist structure 
grants the states power over the health, safety, and welfare of their respective 
inhabitants, and the authority to parcel state privileges and immunities to 
foreigners.92  However, any laws, regulations, or policies that negatively impact or 
undermine federal immigration policy, including who is a member of the political 
community, are per se unconstitutional as a matter of original intent.   
This understanding of the Constitution‟s spheres of government is properly 
conceptualized in a number of Supreme Court cases touching upon foreign affairs 
preemption in state-federal immigration law.  From its first federal-state immigration 
case, New York City v. Miln,93 to its most recent decision in Chamber of Commerce 
v. Whiting,94 the Supreme Court has consistently held that state authority over 
                                                          
 89 ALEXANDER ADDISON, REPORTS OF CASES IN THE COUNTY COURTS OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
AND IN THE HIGH COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 189 
(Washington, John Colerick 1800). 
 90 TUCKER, supra note 86, at 128 (emphasis added). 
 91 Id. 
 92 See RAWLE, supra note 86, at 81-82. 
 93 36 U.S. 102 (1837). 
 94 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
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immigration is limited to regulations touching upon traditional powers, or when the 
state regulation works in accordance with federal policy as to not impede or impose 
new conditions on lawful residence.  Meanwhile, any state regulation that may affect 
or disrupt the federal scheme concerning the entrance, expulsion, removal or 
conditions of residence is preempted in that it impedes on United States‟ foreign 
policy objectives. 
In 1837, when the Supreme Court heard New York City v. Miln, there were but a 
few federal regulations touching upon immigration.95  The comprehensive scheme 
that Americans are accustomed to hearing about today was virtually non-existent,96 
yet this statutory void never superseded the constitutional status quo that plenary 
power over immigration rested with the federal government.97  In particular, the Miln 
case concerned the constitutionality of a New York law that required any foreign 
ship or vessel entering the state to provide passenger data.98  For every passenger not 
lawfully reported, the owner would have to pay a seventy-five dollar fine.99 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue under the spheres of government 
paradigm.  If the state law concerned a matter of foreign commerce, the Court would 
weigh its constitutionality in light of congressional power.  However, if the state law 
fell into the category of a “police” provision, 100 then it would be constitutional so 
long as the federal government did not intend to regulate the subject.101  The answer 
to the question ultimately turned as to when the federal regulatory scheme ceased 
and state regulation began.  “[There is “no collision”] with the law of a state, whose 
operation only begins when that of the laws of congress ends; whose operation is not 
even on the same subject, because, although the person on whom it operates is the 
same . . . .”102 
                                                          
 95 See sources cited supra note 42. 
 96 At this point in American history, there were a number of state laws affecting 
immigration and not yet preempted by federal regulation.  See NEUMAN, supra note 43, at 19-
20. 
 97 See Charles, supra note 37, at 67-118. 
 98 Miln, 36 U.S. at 131. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 132.  The Court defined state police power as encompassing “[i]nspection laws, 
quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal 
commerce of a state, and those which respect turnpike-roads, ferries, &c., [as] component 
parts of this mass.”  Id. at 133. 
 101 Id. at 137-38:  
[W]hilst a state is acting within the legitimate scope of its power, as to the end to be 
attained, it may use whatsoever means, being appropriate to that end, it may think fit; 
although they may be the same, or so nearly the same, as scarcely to be 
distinguishable from those adopted by congress, acting under a different power; 
subject, only, say the court, to this limitation, that in the event of collision, the law of 
the state must yield to the law of congress.  The court must be understood, of course, 
as meaning that the law of congress is passed upon a subject within the sphere of its 
power. 
 102 Id. at 138-39 (emphasis added). 
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Indeed, the Court acknowledged state sovereignty over persons who may be 
within its territorial limits, but conditioned this power in terms of traditional federal-
state spheres of government.  At no point did the Court acquiesce to or recognize any 
inherent state immigration powers.  Instead, the Court acknowledged state power 
over “municipal legislation” or what was referred to as “internal police” powers.103   
This basic understanding of the Miln opinion is further supported by the Court‟s 
closing paragraphs.  To set the stage for these paragraphs, Justice Joseph Story 
dissented that the New York law was unconstitutional in that it regulated foreign 
commerce,104 a power he found to be expressly vested with Congress.105  In reply, the 
majority disagreed because the “laws of the United States expressly sanction the 
quarantines,”106 there were no conflicting treaties or trade agreements, and the New 
York law did not “assume to regulate commerce between the port of New York and 
foreign ports.”107  In other words, the Miln majority acknowledged federal plenary 
authority over foreign affairs and immigration, but found insufficient evidence to 
strike down a law that fell within the state‟s respective sphere of government. 
It was not until over a century later that the Supreme Court would again take up 
the federal-state “spheres of government” issue concerning immigration and foreign 
affairs.108  At this point in American jurisprudence, the Court had repeatedly 
affirmed federal plenary authority over immigration and foreign affairs.109  The 
question that remained unsettled was whether a state may regulate on the same 
immigration subject as the federal government without being preempted.110 
In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court answered this question by examining the 
“respective powers of state and national governments” over immigration.111  The 
Court held that once the federal government has ratified a treaty or enacted 
legislation “touching the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens,” no state 
can “add to or take away from the force and effect” of those provisions.112  It 
emphasized the importance of one national foreign policy “free from local 
                                                          
 103 Id. at 139. 
 104 Id. at 154-56 (Story, J., dissenting). 
 105 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. 
 106 Miln, 36 U.S. at 142 (emphasis added). 
 107 Id. at 143. 
 108 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312. U.S. 52 (1941). 
 109 See United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1897); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); 
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 
581 (1889). 
 110 In New York v. Miln, the Supreme Court upheld the state law because it did not operate 
on the same subject.  36 U.S. at 138-39. 
 111 312 U.S. at 62. 
 112 Id. at 63. 
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interference,”113 yet did not foreclose the constitutionality of state immigration laws 
so long as they remained “subordinate to supreme national law.”114 
The Court elaborated on the interplay between immigration, foreign affairs, and 
federal-state laws regulating the same subject as follows: 
Legal imposition of distinct, unusual and extraordinary burdens and 
obligation upon aliens—such as subjecting them alone, though perfectly 
law-abiding, to indiscriminate and repeated interception and interrogation 
by public officials—thus bears an inseparable relationship to the welfare 
and tranquility of all the states, and not merely to the welfare and 
tranquility of one.  Laws imposing such burdens are not mere census 
requirements, and even though they may be immediately associated with 
the accomplishment of a local purpose, they provoke questions in the field 
of international affairs . . . . And where the federal government, in the 
exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete 
scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the 
registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of 
Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal 
law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.115 
This passage seemingly forecloses the passage of any state laws that burden 
aliens—lawful or unlawful—any more than the federal government intended.  The 
Hines Court was rather clear that federal immigration law was paramount to state 
law.  Still, the Court never foreclosed every state law concerning immigration, for it 
inferred that one of the threshold foreign affairs preemption queries rested with 
whether aliens, as a class, were burdened any more by the complimentary state law 
than the federal government intended. 
Thirty-five years later the Supreme Court again articulated this construct of the 
foreign affairs preemption doctrine, albeit with a narrow caveat.116  The case, 
DeCanas v. Bica, addressed whether California may prohibit and punish the 
employment of unlawfully present aliens.117  The Court reiterated that it “never held 
that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of 
immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this [federal] constitutional power, 
whether latent or exercised.”118  The Court even reaffirmed the plenary power 
doctrine, stating that the federal scheme is “paramount” to “vital state interests” 
affecting immigration.119  However, the Immigration and Nationality Act did not 
provide any indication that Congress sought to preclude the states‟ “police power” to 
regulate employment.120  Thus, the Court upheld the California law as constitutional. 
                                                          
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 68. 
 115 Id. at 65-67. 
 116 DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
 117 Id. at 352-53. 
 118 Id. at 355 (emphasis added). 
 119 Id. at 357. 
 120 Id. at 356, 359-61. 
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The caveat of DeCanas was the Court‟s acknowledgement that unlawfully 
present aliens were not as similarly situated with lawfully present aliens in the realm 
of foreign affairs preemption.121  This caveat is important, for it affirmed the states 
may discriminate against unlawfully present aliens.  At the same time however, the 
caveat is rather narrow.  At no point did the DeCanas Court acquiesce to any or 
every law that discriminates against unlawfully present aliens.  It merely held that 
the California law operated in a traditional area of state police power and 
complimented the federal scheme.  In the words of Justice William J. Brennan, the 
California law remedied “local problems, and operates only on local employers, and 
only with respect to individuals whom the Federal Government has already declared 
cannot work in this country.”122 
Brennan‟s articulation of foreign affairs preemption is crucial, for six years later 
he authored the last two Supreme Court opinions to address the issue in the 
framework of federal immigration law—Plyer v. Doe123 and Toll v. Moreno.124  In 
Plyer, the Court struck down a Texas law denying public school benefits to the 
children of unlawfully present aliens.  The opinion is an anomaly of sorts.  This is 
due to Justice Brennan reaffirming permissible state discrimination to unlawfully 
present aliens, yet finding the children not to be a “comparably situated” class.125  
The rationale being the Texas law imposed a “discriminatory burden on the basis of 
a legal characteristic over which children can have little control.”126   
Placing this distinguishing factor aside,127 Brennan properly stressed how federal 
immigration law takes into account foreign policy considerations.  It was for this 
reason that the Court must ensure state immigration laws, “with respect to illegal 
aliens . . . mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal.”128  To put 
it another way, Plyer confirmed the legal proposition that state or local legislation 
cannot affect the federal scheme as to negatively impact foreign relations.  Unless 
the state or local law “harmoniously” advances a federal objective, and falls within 
                                                          
 121 The Court reiterated its holding in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission , stating, 
“State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens 
lawfully within the United States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to 
regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held invalid.”  Id. at 358 (quoting Takashi v. 
Fish & Game Comm‟n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (emphasis added)). 
 122 Id. at 363. 
 123 Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 124 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982). 
 125 Plyer, 457 U.S. at 219-20. 
 126 Id. at 220. 
 127 See Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda 
of Constitutional Theory: Reflections on, and Beyond, Plyer v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 329 
(1983).  See also Dan Solemani, Note, Plyer in Peril: Why the Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Plyer v. Doe is at Risk of Being Reversed—And What Congress Should Do About It, 25 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 195 (2010) (arguing Plyer is in danger of being overruled should the Court apply 
a rationale basis standard of review to laws affecting undocumented children). 
 128 Plyer, 457 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added). 
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the respective sphere of government, it could be subject to foreign affairs 
preemption.129 
Just two weeks later, Brennan elaborated on this legal proposition in Toll v. 
Moreno.  Writing for the majority, Brennan found a Maryland law denying G-4 
status aliens in-state tuition unconstitutional.  In formulating the opinion, Brennan 
relied on foreign affairs preemption doctrine—“[This Court‟s prior decisions] stand 
for the broad principle that “state regulation not congressionally sanctioned that 
discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it 
imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.”130  
It is important to point out that Brennan and the Toll majority expressly 
denounced the proposition that foreign affairs preemption requires “a clear 
encroachment on exclusive federal power to admit aliens into the country or a clear 
conflict with a specific congressional purpose” to apply to state laws.131  In other 
words, the federal government did not have to show the state law conflicted with 
express foreign policy objectives to succeed on a foreign affairs preemption claim.  
The federal government only needed to show an “ancillary „burden not contemplated 
by Congress.‟”132 
Since Toll, the Supreme Court has yet to expand or contract the foreign affairs 
preemption doctrine concerning immigration.  Given that Congress has twice 
enacted comprehensive immigration reform with the 1986 Immigration Reform and 
Control Act and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act, this may come as a surprise.  In fact, the closest the Court has come in recent 
years is Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, but the majority was able to brush aside 
the foreign affairs argument given the Arizona law at issue fell within a savings 
clause. 133  The majority buttressed this position with the fact that licensing laws fall 
within the traditional state sphere of government.134  For these reasons the Court 
found no interference with the federal scheme or national foreign policy135 
In light of Arizona S.B. 1070, however, the Court‟s thirty year silence on foreign 
affairs preemption and federal-state immigration law will end.  Part III takes up this 
issue and provides the framework for how the Court should examine its provisions in 
                                                          
 129 Id. at 226. 
 130 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1982) (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 
n.6 (1976). 
 131 Id. at 11 n.16 (Rehnquist, W., J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 132 Id. at 14. 
 133 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
 134 Those defending the constitutionality of S.B. 1070 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2010) assert that the Supreme Court‟s decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting supports 
S.B. 1070‟s attrition through enforcement scheme.  See Brief for Petitioner at 33-34, Arizona 
v. United States, No. 11-182 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2011), 2011 WL 3556244 at *1, available at 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Arizona-v.-USA-cert.pdf.  (This 
is a rather broad reading of the Whiting decision; a close reading indicates that Arizona‟s 
licensing laws passed constitutional scrutiny due to the subject being a traditional area of state 
concern and within a federal savings clause). 
 135 See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1983. 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss1/5
2012] RECENTERING FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION 151 
 
accordance with both the Constitution‟s historical purpose and foreign affairs 
preemption doctrine. 
IV.  CENTERING FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARIZONA 
S.B. 1070 
As discussed in the beginning of this Article, the problem that plagued the lower 
federal courts is the lack of a centered approach to foreign affairs preemption.136  
Even at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the majority and dissenting opinions 
were not objectively centered with the Constitution‟s history and subsequent 
Supreme Court precedent.  Each opinion rests at different ends of the foreign affairs 
preemption spectrum.  The majority interprets foreign affairs preemption loosely by 
asserting that the executive branch‟s priorities are sufficient to preempt state or local 
immigration laws.137  The problem with this approach is it conflicts with the 
Supreme Court repeatedly stating that congressional intent is the primary benchmark 
to operate from.138  More importantly, the fact that the executive branch has changed 
its policy numerous times in recent years, dependant on the respective 
administration, makes it difficult to accept this preemption argument as 
constitutionally valid.  In other words, for any court to support this position is to 
claim that the executive branch may reinterpret federal law at its convenience, 
preempt state immigration law at will, and perhaps other areas of state regulation. 
A different consequence presents itself if one agrees with the dissent.  Judge 
Carlos T. Bea‟s claim that foreign affairs preemption requires the federal 
government to pinpoint “established foreign policy goals” and demonstrate more 
than “any effect on foreign relations generally”139 does not adequately capture 
Supreme Court precedent touching upon foreign affairs preemption.  If anything, 
Bea‟s interpretation essentially mirrors the failed dissent in Toll v. Moreno, where 
then Associate Justice William Rehnquist argued foreign affairs preemption required 
a “clear encroachment on exclusive federal power to admit aliens” or a “clear 
conflict with a specific congressional purpose.”140   
To be precise, Bea‟s approach to foreign affairs preemption fails to take into 
account clearly established precedent that state or local immigration laws may be 
foreign affairs preempted if it fails any portion of a three-part inquiry.  Precedent 
dictates that foreign affairs preemption is triggered if the state or local law (1) 
regulates a facet of immigration policy solely within the federal sphere of 
                                                          
 136 Given the impact of immigration laws in both the domestic and international sphere, the 
preemption dilemma facing the federal judiciary extends well beyond the foreign affairs 
preemption doctrine.  See Nathan G. Cortez, The Local Dilemma: Preemption and the Role of 
Federal Standards in State and Local Immigration Laws, 61 SMU L. REV. 47 (2008);  Olivas, 
Preempting Preemption, supra note 28, at 219-20 (discussing the constant tug of war between 
state and federal governments over immigration policy); Cunningham-Parameter, supra note 
29, at 1688. 
 137 United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 352-53 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 138 See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1982); 
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68-73 (1941); 
N.Y.C. v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 137-39 (1837). 
 139 Arizona, 641 F.3d at 381 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
 140 Toll, 458 U.S. at 29 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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government,141 (2) regulates immigration outside the traditional state or local 
government‟s sphere and in a manner that it undermines the federal scheme,142 or (3) 
if the law imposes discriminatory burdens on the alien class as a whole—lawful and 
unlawful—even if the law only seeks to burden unlawful aliens.143 
                                                          
 141 See Plyer, 457 U.S. at 225; Toll, 458 U.S. at 11; DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354-55; Hines, 
312 U.S. at 62-63; Miln, 36 U.S. at 132-33, 137-39. 
 142 See Plyer, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19, 225-26; Toll, 458 U.S. at 14-17; DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 
356-63; Hines, 312 U.S. at 65-67. 
 143 See Plyer, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19; Toll, 458 U.S. at 13; DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358 n.6; 
Hines, 312 U.S. at 69.  For another three part approach to examining the constitutionality of 
state immigration laws, see Cortez, supra note 136, at 52 (adopting a general preemption 
approach with the DeCanas opinion).  For a three part approach to foreign affairs preemption 
generally, to include immigration preemption issues, see Harold G. Maier, Preemption of 
State Law, A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT‟L L. 832 (1989) (“a court must (1) 
determine whether the state law falls within the realm of acceptable state authority; (2) 
determine whether the state act in question touches on matters relating to foreign affairs; and 
(3) balance the value of achieving a nationally uniform position against the value of giving 
effect to local decision-making on the question involved, to arrive at a decision that accurately 
reflects the appropriate roles of the states and the nation in regulating the subject matter 
concerned.”). 
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This three-part inquiry is in line with the Founders‟ intent when drafting the 
Constitution to ensure a “more perfect Union.”144  As discussed in Part I, power over 
immigration, foreign affairs, naturalization, and citizenship was intended to be 
centralized with the federal government as a means to prevent foreign 
embarrassments at the state level.145  The federal-state balance struck is perhaps best 
conceptualized by William Rawle in his 1825 treatise A View of the Constitution of 
the United States of America: 
The United States do[es] not intermeddle with the local regulations of the 
states in [respect to its privileges and immunities].  Thus an alien may be 
admitted to hold lands in some states, and be incapable of doing so in 
others.  On the other hand, there are certain incidents to the character of a 
citizen of the United States, with which the separate states cannot 
interfere. The nature, extent, and duration of the allegiance due to the 
                                                          
 144 U.S. CONST.  pmbl. 
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United States, the right to the general protection and to commercial 
benefits at home and abroad, derived either from treaties or from the acts 
of congress, are beyond the control of the states, nor can they increase or 
diminish the disadvantages to which aliens may, by such measures on the 
part of the general government, be subjected.146 
Often relying on history (particularly eighteenth and nineteenth century history) 
to decide modern cases and controversies can prove controversial in that it may 
conflict with principles of stare decisis or the evolution of legal customs as guided 
by judicial precedent.147  Also, in many instances, what was deemed the 
constitutional status quo in the eighteenth or nineteenth century is no longer 
applicable today.148  As Kent Greenawalt aptly states it, “[c]ustomary law depends 
on existing customary practice.  What has once been a rule of customary law can 
cease to be so if customary morality or practice alters radically.”149   
To put it another way, the question that always looms when importing history 
into modern cases and controversies is whether there has been a change to the law 
that supersedes the historical record.  Fortunately, in the case of dividing 
immigration powers between federal and state governments this does not apply.  The 
Constitution has never been amended to redistribute these powers, nor is there any 
Supreme Court precedent that conflicts with the Founders‟ intent.  Thus, in the case 
of foreign affairs preemption, history stabilizes and confirms the Court‟s precedent, 
rather than undermines it. 
If one applies this foreign affairs preemption construct to contemporary state or 
local laws and the current federal immigration scheme, a number of state and local 
immigration laws should be foreign affairs preempted, including provisions of 
Arizona S.B. 1070.  An entire field of law that falls into this category is the growing 
attempts to criminalize immigration law at the state level.  As Juliet P. Stumpf 
details, a number of states are reimagining immigration law as a “domestic affair 
linked with employment, welfare, and crime” as a means to “expand judicial 
acceptance of state and local participation in immigration control.”150  Perhaps these 
                                                          
 146 RAWLE, supra note 86, at 81-82 (emphasis added). 
 147 Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 452-55, 
474-95 (1984). 
 148 For a discussion, see DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 387-99 (discussing the different 
outcomes of Brown v. Board of Education should one apply different objectivity theories, 
including originalism). 
 149 KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 183 (1992). 
 150 Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1565 (2008).  Stumpf astutely sums up the legal dilemma 
state criminalization is imposing on foreign policy: 
[T]he development of crimmigration law transformed immigration law and its 
enforcement.  Although immigration law maintains the veneer of a civil proceeding, it 
has become infused with national security concerns and substantive criminal law 
norms.  This development has in turn invited states to occupy the space created by the 
linking of crimmigration law and national security, implanting in the public 
imagination a role for police to address terrorism concerns as part and parcel of their 
work.  When the traditional police enforcement of criminal laws intermingles with 
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laws could survive implied preemption analysis.  In terms of foreign affairs 
preemption, however, absent the invitation of the federal government to criminalize 
immigration at a state or local level, such laws are unconstitutionally regulating a 
nontraditional sphere of government: the conditions of presence, residence, or 
domicile of aliens.  Indeed, as the history of the Constitution shows, state or local 
governments may retract privileges and immunities as a means to curtail unlawful 
immigration,151 but to criminalize immigration at the state or local level—lawful or 
unlawful—treads into federal plenary power. 
It is more than reasonable to argue that Arizona S.B. 1070 Section 3 qualifies in 
this respect, for it establishes a separate state crime for unlawful presence.152  Section 
3 stipulates, in addition to any federal penalties for unlawful presence,153 an unlawful 
alien in Arizona will be found guilty of the crime of trespassing and ordered to pay 
any jail costs associated.  This law cannot survive foreign affairs preemption.  
Section 3 not only does regulate a federal sphere of immigration without any express 
authority to do so, but there is little, if any, tradition of states fining immigrants for 
unlawful presence.154 
On similar grounds, foreign affairs preemption would also be applicable to the 
warrantless arrest provision in Arizona S.B. 1070, which provides that a “peace 
officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to 
believe . . . [t]he person to be arrested has committed any public offense that makes 
the person removable from the United States.”155  A “warrantless” arrest for 
immigration violations is not only inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1252c,156 but also 
                                                          
immigration law and terrorism, the delineation between foreign policy and domestic 
law falls away. 
Id. at 1595-96. 
 151 See Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1191 n.20 (9th Cir. 2010) (confirming state 
and local governments may institute unlawful immigrant protections in state or local 
elections); Charles, Representation Without Documentation?, supra note 48, at 41-45 
(detailing that state and local governments may exclude aliens from apportionment as to 
ensure political integrity at state and local elections). 
 152 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(A) (2010) (West). 
 153 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e), 1306(a) (2012). 
 154 South Carolina S.B. 20 Section 5(A) would also be foreign affairs preempted on similar 
grounds.  It imposes a state fine on any alien that fails to carry alien registration pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1304.  See S.B. 20, 119th Leg. Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011) (“It is unlawful for a person 
eighteen years of age or older to fail to carry in the person‟s personal possession any 
certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card issued to the person pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. Section 1304 while the person is in this State.”).  By regulating a condition of 
lawful presence (even by monetary fines), the South Carolina provision is foreign affairs 
preempted in that it occupies an area solely within the federal sphere of government without 
an express invitation to do so.  See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11 (1982); DeCanas v. Bica, 
424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941). 
 155 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(E) (West 2010) (emphasis added). 
 156 The statute provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to the extent permitted by relevant State 
and local law, State and local law enforcement officials are authorized to arrest and 
detain an individual who—(1) is an alien illegally present in the United States; and (2) 
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places immigration enforcement in the hands of state officials.  Certainly, if a state 
or local official was instructed by federal immigration authorities to detain an 
individual or took steps to cooperate with federal authorities,157 this would facially 
be constitutionally permissible.158   
This last legal point is significant because it serves as the justification for the 
constitutionality of S.B. 1070 Section 2(B), even under a foreign affairs preemption 
paradigm.159  While Section 6 is phrased in a manner that usurps the delicate 
constitutional balance in the area of foreign affairs, Section 2(B) is not.160  At no 
point does Section 2(B) acquiesce to a federally independent determination of 
immigration status.  Instead, it works perfectly within the constraints of 8 U.S.C. § 
1357(g) by requiring verification of immigration status by the federal authorities. 
Certainly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals majority was correct to question 
the constitutionality of Section 2(B) under a foreign affairs preemption paradigm.  
The majority just applied the test improperly and mischaracterized 8 U.S.C. § 
1357(g) as a whole in the process.161  This section, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), establishes a 
system for state and local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration law—the 
287(g) program.  By entering into an agreement with the Attorney General, the state 
or locality‟s officials would “be qualified to perform a function of an immigration 
officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the 
United States.”162   
                                                          
has previously been convicted of a felony in the United States and deported or left the 
United States after such conviction, but only after the State or local law enforcement 
officials obtain appropriate confirmation from the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service of the status of such individual and only for such period of time as may be 
required for the Service to take the individual into Federal custody for purposes of 
deporting or removing the alien from the United States.  
8 U.S.C. §§ 1252c(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 157 See generally H.B. 56 2011 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011). This is a constitutional example of 
state legislation where the state and local enforcement officers are required to verify the 
immigration status of any alien “arrested and booked” with the proper federal authorities.  
This provision not only works to deter unlawful immigration in accordance with the federal 
immigration scheme, but also requires the determination to be made by federal authorities.  
Section 12(b) also passes any foreign affairs preemption discriminatory burdens, for it does 
not impede or discriminate against law-abiding lawfully present aliens. 
 158 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252c, 1373, 1644 (West 2012). 
 159 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (West 2010). 
 160 Other states maintain similar provisions.  See e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-
1003(1)(a)(i) (2012) (requiring “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful presence, verification with 
federal authorities, and that the purpose of the stop or suspicion be in accordance with the 
United States and Utah Constitutions); Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 
2011. H.B. 87, Art. 5(b), (d) 2011 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011) (requiring “probable cause” of 
unlawful presence, verification with federal authorities, and the stop or probable cause cannot 
be based on “race, color, or national origin”); An Act Relating to Illegal Immigration, H.B. 
56., § 12(a) 2011 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011) (requiring “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful 
presence, verification with federal authorities, and purpose of the stop or suspicion in 
accordance with the United States and Alabama Constitutions).  
 161 See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 352-53 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 162 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2012). 
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However, the 287(g) program does not limit state verification inquiries in 
accordance with federal law.  The 287(g) program makes state and local officials the 
near equivalent of federal immigration officials.163  In other words, political 
subdivisions that enter into the 287(g) program may enforce portions of federal 
immigration law when in contact with an unlawfully present alien, often without the 
express direction of a federal official.  Indeed, the 287(g) program places the state or 
local officials under the “direction and supervision of the Attorney General,”164 but 
this does not preclude state and local officials from making independent immigration 
decisions when necessary.165 
This understanding of congressional purposes and objectives for the 287(g) 
program is supported by the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1).  For an official to be 
“qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the 
investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens” is to have some independent 
authority to act.166  In contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) does not grant state and local 
officials any discretionary authority.  It merely authorizes communication with 
federal officials by requiring “cooperat[ion] with the Attorney General in the 
identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in 
the United States.”167  There is a substantial difference between having federal 
investigatory authority, and cooperating with the Attorney General to identify 
unlawfully present aliens.  The former is quasi-independent authority under the color 
of federal authority, and the latter requires the assistance of the federal authorities.   
It is for these reasons that S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) passes the first two parts of the 
foreign affairs preemption inquiry easily.  Section 2(B) regulates the traditional 
sphere of state law enforcement policies, and does so in a manner consistent with 
federal policy objectives as envisioned by Congress.  However, this still leaves 
Section 2(B) susceptible to one category of foreign affairs preemption 
unaddressed—state or local laws that impose discriminatory burdens on lawfully 
present aliens.  As Supreme Court precedent confirms, the states may adopt 
discriminatory legislation as a means to deter unlawful immigration consistent with 
federal objectives.168  Section 2(B) undoubtedly accomplishes this.  The question left 
unanswered is whether compelling state and local law enforcement to verify 
immigration status imposes discriminatory burdens on lawfully present aliens.169  
Providing a definitive answer to this question is rather difficult, but without any 
                                                          
 163 §§ 1357(g)(2)-(3), (8). 
 164 § 1357(g)(3). 
 165 It is worth noting that if the state of Arizona had 287(g) authority, section 6 could 
survive foreign affairs preemption.  This is because every Arizona law enforcement officer 
would have some independent federal authority to make a determination of unlawful status.  
Of course, given that the state of Arizona does not have 287(g) authority, section 6 is foreign 
affairs preempted. 
 166 § 1357(g)(1) (emphasis added). 
 167 § 1357(g)(10) (emphasis added). 
 168 Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.6 (1976); 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm‟n, 334 U.S. 410,419 (1948). 
 169 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1982).  See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
65-66 (1941). 
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compelling data showing rampant discrimination, Section 2(B) should be held to 
pass the third part of the foreign affairs preemption inquiry.170 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Constitution‟s purpose in centralizing foreign affairs and immigration with 
the federal government, coupled with subsequent foreign affairs preemption 
precedent, provides the Supreme Court with the necessary guideposts to adjudicate 
the provisions in S.B. 1070.  Absent a treaty or international agreement stating 
express foreign policy objectives, executive policy preferences alone are insufficient 
to preempt state and local immigration laws.  Instead, it is Congress‟s purposes and 
objectives that are the benchmark from which courts must adjudicate foreign affairs 
preemption.   
Arizona S.B. 1070 is not saved from preemption just because it does not 
implicitly conflict with the federal scheme.  The Court‟s longstanding foreign affairs 
preemption doctrine provides instances where a state or local law may still be 
preempted after surviving traditional preemption analyses.  This occurs when state or 
local governments regulate immigration outside their constitutionally allocated or 
traditional sphere of government.  However, there are other instances where a state 
or local immigration law may be preempted, including when a state or local law may 
work within the federal scheme or be an attribute to state and local police power, yet 
impose discriminatory burdens on lawfully present aliens not contemplated by 
Congress. 
                                                          
 170 Compare Kris W. Kobach, Why Arizona Drew a Line, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/opinion/29kobach.html (arguing that federal 
law requires all aliens to carry registration papers, which would make the checking of alien 
registration a discriminatory burden contemplated by Congress), with Kevin Johnson, 
Response to Arizona v. United States Symposium Contributors, SCOTUSBLOG (July 19, 2011, 
10:53 AM), available at https://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/response-to-arizona-v-united-
states-symposiu m-contributors/ (state enforcement will increase racial profiling, which would 
impose a discriminatory burden not contemplated by Congress). 
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